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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Agnes Payotelis by this appeal seeks 
1 ev1ew of a decision by the Board of Review of the 
;ndustrial Commission of Utah denying her unemployment 
compensation benefits pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4(c) 
(1953, as amended) for failure to meet work search 
requirements for eligibility. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On November 9, 1982, the Department of Employment 
Security issued a decision denying Appellant Agnes Payotelis 
unemployment compensation insurance benefits retroactive to 
October 3, 1982. The basis for the denial was inadequate 
job search. Appellant Payotelis was also charged with an 
overpayment liability of $536.00. 
On January 4, 1983, after a hearing on the matter, 
Appeals Referee Christopher W. Love issued a decision 
modifying the Department of Employment Security's decision. 
The Referee denied benefits for the periods October 3 
through October 23, and November 28, 1982, and continuing. 
The Referee also reduced the overpayment liability to 
$402.00. 
On March 29, 1983, the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the Referee's 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks the Court to reverse Respondent's 
decision that Appellant failed to make an active work search 
effort. Appellant further asks the Court to enter 
judgment that Respondent's decision was net 
substantial evidence and was not in compliance with 1 ... ,, 
law. Finally, Appellant asks that the Court find that 
.- .. '.:_ 
is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits frsr 
October 3, 1982, until she is no longer otherwise eligible 
and that therefore, as a matter of law, no 
compensation benefits received by Appellant after October l, 
1982, were overpayments. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On November 1, 1982, Department of Employment 
Security Representative S. Chapman conducted an ellgib1lit 
interview with Appellant. (R. 64) During this interview 
Appellant filled out a form provided by Chapman. (R.63-641 
Appellant listed ten job contacts on the space provided or 
the form and an additional five contacts on a separate shee' 
of paper. (R.42-43) The separate sheet of paper was lost b:. 
the Department. (R. 42) Of her contacts listed that day, six 
were in-person and nine were made by telephone. The 
representative informed Appellant during the meeting that 
she would have to make three in-person job search contacts 
each week to be eligible for benefits. (R. 64) During th1i 
same interview, Appellant also signed a statement written 1' 
the representative stating that Appellant was making a 
of her employer contacts by telephone because of her lack 
money to buy gas to go in person. (R.62) Eight days af:o: 
this interview, Appellant received a notice that r.c: 
2 
1Jenef1ts had been terminated retroactive to October 3, 1982, 
«r.d tliat she owed the Department $536.00 in overpayments. 
(H, bl) 
On November 15, 1982, Appellant requested a 
:iedring. She received a hearing on December 9, 1982. (R.60) 
Appellant presented evidence in the hearing that she had 
contacted 35 employers in 67 days. (R. 33-36, 64). Of these 
contacts, 22 were in-person and 13 were by telephone. 
On January 4, 1983, Appeals Referee Christopher 
Love modified the decision of the Department representative. 
He denied Appellant benefits from October 3, 1982, through 
October 23, 1982, allowed benefits for the weeks ending 
October 30, November 6, November 13, November 20, and 
November 27, 1982, and denied benefits from November 28, 
1982, henceforth. The overpayment amount was also modified 
down to $402.00. 
The Appeals 
telephone contacts were 
Referee found that Appellant's 
generally insufficient and that 
Appellant was required to contact at least two new potential 
employers in person every week. The Referee also found that 
Appellant was at fault in the creation of a $402.00 
overpayment and would be responsible for paying it back. 
On January 13, 1983, Appellant filed an appeal 
Frum the decision of the Appeals Referee to the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission. (R.10-13) In its 
deci s1on, the Board affirmed and adopted the findings of 
t,,,-t and conclusions of law in the decision by the Appeals 
Hc=fetee ( R. S) 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Agnes Payotelis is a 49 year old w,ma, 
who has most recently worked as a pest control extermiiiaecr 
(R. 39-40) Her last job was with Terminex, Inc. where sec 
had worked for nearly three years before being laid off oc. 
July 31, 1982. {R.39-40, 55) She was earning $1,200.00 per 
month when laid off. {R.40) Prior to that she had workec 
for Orkin, Inc., another exterminator company. (R.46) She 
also has work experience as a seamstress and has worked in a 
wallpaper store and a specialty food store. {R.46-47) Prior 
to her current unemployment, Appellant had not 
unemployment benefits in the last twenty years. (R.53) 
Since being laid off she has looked for work each 
and every week. At the hearing she presented a list of the 
in-person contacts she had made the last week of October at 
the Cottonwood Mall. {R.33) This list was used to replace 
the one which Appellant had submitted prior to the 
termination of her benefits but which the agency had lost. 
{R. 41-42) Appellant also presented a lengthy list of the 
job contacts she had made up to the date of the hearing. 
{R. 34-36) 
Payotelis contacted all of the pest control 
in Salt Lake City in-person during her search for emplo,,-
ment. {R. 51) She testified that she relied on the telephur. 1 
to make follow up contacts with the exterminator companJec 
and to set up appointments for interviews. (R. 49-50) Most 
4 
nt the time the companies would tell her they were not 
t:ok1ng applications or giving interviews. (R.50) 
She further testified that she has not had money 
fur gas since being terminated from unemployment benefits. 
(R.SCJ) Likewise, she has not had money for the bus. (R.44) 
She testified that she walked from her home in West Jordan 
17079 South 1115 West) to Fashion Place Mall (6200 South 
State Street) in Murray on one job search venture. (R. 44) 
She has also resorted to hitch-hiking to make an in-person 
contact. (R.52) To be able to appear at her hearing 
Appellant had to borrow gas money from her daughter, 
something that she is morally opposed to doing. (R.45) 
At the time of her hearing Appellant had not been 
able to pay her gas utility bill. (R. 52) She had to sell 
her t.v., stereo, microwave, extra tires and other household 
items to make her monthly house payments of $125.00. 
IR. 52-53) Furthermore, she had gone without food for two 
days prior to applying for her hearing. (R.52) 
Appellant has contacted and applied for many jobs 
that pay much less than what she was earning at Terminex. 
IR.43) Though she has stated that the least she feels she 
have to accept is $900.00 per month (R.40), since 
being terminated from benefits she has become desperate and 
destitute. (R.43) Not knowing whether she will get her 
benefits again, she has been willing to take just about 
anything. (R. 43) 
5 
In addition to her 37 contacts over the two mr,nc 
immediately preceding her hearing, Appellant W<"nt intu ,, 
Job Service office twice weekl·; to check the JOb bvdtds 
1
_ 
responded to the one referral she has received frcm 
Service (Orkin, Inc.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1) Did Appellant act in good faith to make ac 
active and reasonable effort to secure employment? 
2) Is the "2 to 3 new, in-person contact rule" a 
valid legal standard? 
3) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require that 
recipients of Utah unemployment compensation benefits 
afforded a Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
prior to being deprived of such payments? 
ARGUMENT 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT CONDUCTED A DILIGENT JOB SEARCH. 
Utah law provides that: 
An unemployed individual shall be 
eligible to receive benefits with 
respect to any week only if it has 
been found by the commission that: 
(c) He :LS able to work and lS 
available for work each anC. 
every week with respect to which he 
made a claim for benefits under-
6 
this Act, and acted in good faith in 
an active effort to secure 
employment, ... 
cai1 Code Ann. §35-4-4 (1953, as amended) (emphasis added). 
Utah law further clarifies the manner in which 
this requirement is to be interpreted and imposed in the 
next section of the Code, Ineligibility for benefits: 
An individual shall be ineligible 
for benefits or for purposes of 
establishing a waiting period: 
Failure to Apply for or Accept Work. 
(c) If the commission finds that 
the claimant has failed without good 
cause to properly apply for available 
suitable work ... provided no claimant 
shall be ineligible for benefits for 
failure to apply, accept a referral, 
or accept suitable work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it 
would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall consider the 
purposes of this act, the reasonable-
ness of the claimant's actions, and 
the extent to which the actions 
evidence a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market in reaching a 
determination of whether the ineligi-
bility of a claimant is contrary to 
equity and good conscience. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-3-5 (c), (1953, as amended). 
As noted above, in determining whether or not 
1"rrel Jant has failed without good cause to properly apply 
I •JI a ·;a i lab le suitable work, the commission must take into 
cnns1derat1on, among other factors, the "purposes of this 
•rt u C.A. §35-4-2 states this public policy and purpose: 
7 
As a guide to the interpretation 
and application of this act, the 
public policy of this state is 
declared to be as follows: Economic 
insecurity due to unemployment is a 
serious menace to the health, morals, 
and welfare of the people of this 
state. Unemployment is therefore a 
subject of general interest and 
concern which requires appropriate 
action by the legislature to prevent 
its spread and to lighten its burden 
which now so often falls with crushing 
force upon the unemployed worker and 
his family. The achievement of Social 
Security requires protection against 
this greatest hazard of our economic 
life .... The legislature, therefore, 
declares that in its considered 
judgment the public good, and the 
general welfare of the citizens of 
this state require the enactment of 
this measure .... 
It has since been held, that this Act, bernc 
remedial in nature should be liberally construed. 
Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm. 13 4 P. 2d 4 79 (Utah, 
1943) reh.den. 141 P.2d 694 (Utah 1943). The Act should be 
administered to effectuate its purposes, which include 
lightening the burdens of unemployment and maintainirc 
purchasing power in the economy. Johnson v. Board of Revie·, 
of Industrial Comm., 320 P.2d 315 (Utah 1958). 
The remedial purpose of the Act was further statec 
in Singer Sewing Machine, supra, to protect the healt:, 
morals, and welfare of the people by providing a cush1c; 
against the shocks and rigors of unemployment. The purpu 0 • 
of providing benefits was defined as twofold: First, 
alleviate the need of the worker and his family who 
market for their services, and were deprived of wages by t\f 
8 
business collapse; Second, to provide increased 
power through pump-priming, and, thereby, to 
our economic system. 
,,L P. 2d 964 (Utah 1952). 
It is clear from the 
purpose of the Act that the 
Lexes v. Industrial Corrun. , 
words of the statute and the 
law requires a subjective 
analysis of the individual claimant's acts. The statute 
requires the claimant to act 
effort to secure employment." 
11953, as amended) 
in "good faith in an active 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5 (c) 
That the law requires a subjective analysis is 
further clarified in the case law. The Utah Supreme Court 
held in the case of Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P.2d 626 
IUtah 1977) that the claimant "must act in good faith to 
make an active and reasonable effort to secure employment, 
and must be genuinely attached to the labor market." Id. at 
628. This principle has not changed. The words "good 
faith" and "reasonable effort" imply a 
individualized analysis of the claimants' 
subjective 
job search 
efforts. The law does not require the "2 to 3 new, 
in-person contacts" imposed by the Appeals Referee. (R.15) 
Appellant's job search was made in good faith 
through reasonable efforts. She testified that she 
Gntacted each and every pest control business in the Salt 
';kp area in an effort to find re-employment in the job 
she is most qualified to do, that of pest 
, ;; i t-:> 1 rn n at or , She contacted these pest control firms either 
9 
in-person or by phone. Furthermore, she has maintaine< 
contact with them by calling back on a weekly basis to fir,, 
out if there are any new job openings. Appellant's _iC:L 
search has thus been very thorough in the field in whicr. or." 
is most qualified. Even so, Appellant did not stop there. 
She also contacted many businesses which were not pest 
control companies but which had job openings which she felt 
she would be able to do. 
Appellant was earning $1,200.00 per month as an 
exterminator for Terminex, Inc. She testified during her 
hearing that her financial situation required new employment 
that would pay at least $900.00 per month. Nevertheless, 
Appellant has gone without income of any kind for so long 
now that she has, at times, earnestly sought work which pays 
only minimum wage. The vast majority of these contacts have 
been in-person. 
In all, Appellant contacted 35 businesses within 
67 days. Including weekends, that is an average of one 
contact every 1.9 days. Out of her 35 contacts, 22 were 
in-person. This is an average of 1 in-person contact ever' 
3 days or slightly more than 2 in-person contacts each weef-. 
Thus, even though Appellant Payotelis contests ':r.t 
legitimacy of the 2 to 3 in-person contact rule, she "" 
substantially complied with it. 
It is true that Appellant did not ever• 
distribute her job search efforts so that she could makl 
exactly 2 in-person contacts each and every week 65 
l 0 
pe,spnndent would have her do. Some weeks she made more than 
:- in-perscn contacts, some weeks less. Appellant's search 
,1c1 s fitted to her own personal circumstances. She made 
in-person contacts to as many businesses as she could, given 
her :inancial resources. She would go to several companies 
on one day all within close vicinity. This helped her 
conserve gas. Had she nicely spaced her job search trips, 
she would unduly increase travel distances. When Appellant 
could not afford gas she walked or hitch-hiked to look for 
work. She visited several companies in one trip because of 
the time and distances involved. These measures are all 
within the statutory definition of a reasonable good faith 
effort to secure employment given Appellant's particular 
circumstances. 
Adding to the reasonableness of her efforts was 
the fact that Appellant would often call before expending 
gas or walking to a company. If there are no job openings 
then Appellant should not be required to waste her precious 
cesources driving around only to be told the same thing in 
person that she would have been told on the telephone. 
Hunting for a job is a serious and painstaking 
process. Yet Respondent ignores this. The fears and 
pressures which are created by the normal job search are 
, ompuunded many times for a person in Appellant's situation 
c,h·:· is working in a very limited market and who does not 
.ia·;e resources to live day to day, let alone make a job 
sPar,h simply to conform to Respondent's unduly restrictive 
11 
requirements. If she were to follow Respondent's d1rect
1
,
1
, 
to the letter she could go to any two companies in •.own ea 
week and this would be considered an adequate ]Ob SParch. 
Yet Appellant's goals are not simplv to mo,_· 
Respondent's inflexible and structured standards in hope 
that she might retain her unemployment benefits. Insteoc, 
Appellant is concerned with finding the job most suitable:· 
her skills and career goals. Appellant has made a gocc 
faith effort to find a job. Her search efforts have beer, 
reasonable given her circumstances. Respondent should thus 
be required to pay Appellant for those benefits illegall;· 
withheld from her. 
A. Case Law Further Supports Appellant's 
Position. 
The case of Gocke v. Industrial Commission, 420 
P. 2d 44 (Utah 1966) interprets Utah's JOb search 
requirements. The first 2 weeks of Gocke' s job searer. 
consisted of contacting her former employer and inqu1nr,c 
about a job with Shoppers' Discount store. Towards the 
of her first month of unemployment, she made telephone calls 
to 4 employers. Ten days later she personally applied a'. 
Albertsons. She made telephone calls to jewelry stores arc 
near the end of the second month she personally applied '' 
Litton Data Systems. Then during the last week of tr<' 
second month she mailed replies to newspaper 
advertisements. On these facts the Utah Supreme Court fc'. 
that: 
1 2 
There is nothing in the Referee's 
findings which will support any 
inference that she did not make a 
legitimate attempt to obtain work. 
Based upon her apparent clean work 
record, it seems reasonable and 
natural that she should look to her 
former employer in the first instance 
for re-employment. When that 
expectation did not materialize, the 
plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking 
employment elsewhere by personal 
application, telephone calls and 
written responses to newspaper 
advertisements. These affirmative 
acts are all in the record and the 
Referee's own findings of fact. Such 
efforts constitute a reasonable eftort 
on her part to obtain work. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held in Gocke 
that: 
The Employment Security Act should be 
liberally construed to best effectuate 
its purposes which include enabling 
unemployed workers to find suitable 
work and to provide cash benefits 
during periods of unemployment. 
Id. at 46. Certainly the Department has failed to effec-
tuate the Act's purpose in Appellant's case. 
The Gocke decision went on to state: 
Only if it is understood that an 
unemployment compensation law is a 
broad public measure, designed by the 
payment of benefits to check and 
ameliorate the effects of unemployment 
among workers who are able, willing 
and ready to work, will workers be 
assured the reasonable protection 
which the statute has provided for 
them. The same view was expressed by 
Justice Cardozo when he stated: 
"An unemployment law framed in 
such a way that the unemployed 
who look to it will be deprived 
of reasonable protection is one 
13 
in name and nothing more. " See 
Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 548, at 593, 57 S.Ct. 883, 
8 9 1 , 8 1 L. Ed. 1 2 7 9 ( 1 9 3 7 ) . 
Id. at 47. 
The Referee relied on the case of Marvin L. 
v. Board of Review, 638 P. 2d 544 (Utah 1981). (R.15) 
this case fails to address the issue of telephone contact: 
versus in person contacts. Hurd had contacted only three 
businesses in 30 days. This is certainly not the case wi::. 
Agnes Payotelis who made 35 job contacts in 67 days. 
B. The Courts Frown Upon Rigid and Inflexible 
Standards in Job Search Cases. 
The words of the Utah statute do not set a rigic 
and inflexible standard which can be applied in determinicc 
eligibility. Rather, it creates a standard of reasonabilit; 
in the conduct of the claimant in seeking employment, whic: 
must be determined as an issue of fact by the Department 1: 
each particular case in accordance with all of the 
facts and circumstances bearing upon the situation. See, 
Brown v. Board of Review, 289 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. 1972). 
In the case of Employment Security Administrat1ot, 
Board of Appeals v. Smith, 383 A.2d 1108 (Ct. of App. Md, 
1978) the court found that telephone contacts we· 
reasonable in light of the lack of public transportation:· 
the area. Smith had contacted 35 businesses over a 7 ire· 
period, mostly by telephone. The Maryland court found t
1 
in light of all the circumstances, claimant Sm1 th had mac· 
active and reasonable efforts to secure employment. 
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In Cascade Rolling Mills, Inc. v. Employment Div., 
r.2d 549 (Or. App. 1976) the court held that, where for 
a period of less than six weeks after his former employer 
to offer claimant work after being injured on the 
Job, the employee telephoned one other employer and 
registered for work with local union leaders he had been 
"actively seeking work." 
In the case of Bloomfield v. Employment Div., 550 
P.2d 1400 (Or. App. 1976) the court held that 1 personal 
contact and "numerous telephone calls and other contacts" 
were sufficient. 
In Hill v. District Unemployment Compensation 
Board, 302 A.2d 226 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1973) the court in 
similar facts found that neither the ·unemployment 
compensation statute nor the Board's regulations required a 
claimant to make, as a condition precedent, at least three 
job contacts weekly. The court relied upon claimant's 
testimony and the testimony of her witnesses that she had 
made numerous job contacts, and a constant effort to obtain 
employment. The court noted that the Board's findings were 
based largely upon statements set forth on standard forms 
indicating 12 personal job contacts in 12 weeks. The court 
observed that "many of the standard forms, prepared as they 
were by an Illinois claims taker, contained illegible 
ryptLC notes." Id. at 227, 228. 
Similarly with Appellant, she was terminated from 
benef1ts because of a standard form she had filled out and 
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because of a signed confession that had been drawn by 
eligibility worker. 
Case law, both in Utah and across the 
supports Appellant's claim and shows that her ]Ob searc•. ,, 
reasonable within the meaning of the law. 
POINT II. 
THE 2 TO 3 NEW IN-PERSON CONTACT RULE IS 
VOID. 
The 2 to 3 new in-person contact rule as referre: 
to above is void as it is contrary to Utah law and had cc-
been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Utah law at the time 
it was applied to Appellant. The Department can point 
authority to legitimize the 2 to 3 contact rule. The Cta· 
law cited previously clearly requires a subjective analys1; 
of each claimants efforts in light of their personal circoo· 
stances. The 2 to 3 contact rule does not allow for 
analysis to take place. The 2 to 3 contact rule discounte 
telephone contacts in violation of law and their 
"Claimant Guide" which encourages the use of telephone 
calls, resumes and other non-personal contacts. uw. 
Department of Employment Security, Unemployment Insurar." 
Claimant Guide, at 7 (February 1982). The 2 to 3 contac· 
rule has been criticized by the courts as being overly no,: 
and inflexible, and not in compliance with the 
Compensation Act. 
The Utah Administrative Rule-making Act, Utah Cc· 
Ann. §63-46-1 et which is applicable to every 
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the State of Utah sets out the requirements that the 
-state agency must follow prior to adoption, amendment, or 
ce[Jeal of any rule. These requirements mandate the agency 
give prior notice of intended action, provide for public 
comrnen t, and perhaps provide a public hearing. The rule 
must then be filed with the state archivist. The rule must 
then be published in the Utah Bulletin and ultimately 
codified in the Department's Rules of Adjudication. The 2 
to 3 contact rule had clearly never been properly promul-
gated as a rule in Utah and was thus void at the time 
Respondent applied it against Appellant. It is a well 
understood principle of law that a rule is invalid if the 
agency failed to comply with the requisite rulemaking 
requirements, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
Appellant is aware that on January 20, 1983, 
subsequent to the application of the rule against Appellant, 
Respondent began the process of promulgating the 2 to 3 new 
in-person contact rule through emergency rulemaking 
procedures. The new rule took effect April 5, 1983. The 
new rule redefines "good faith work search effort" to 
include, but not be limited to, in-person contacts with 
employers. The rule creates a rebuttable presumption that a 
c:laimant has not made an active work search effort if the 
laimant fails to make a specific minimum number of 
111-1,Jer son employer contacts after being told to do so by a 
local Employment Security office. Utah Admin. Bull. No. 
83-7 al 77 (April 1, 1983). A copy of which is attached to 
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this Brief as Exhibit 1. However, even though the state r.;, 
now promulgated such a rule, it was not in effect at t:,. 
time Payotelis' case was adJudicated. Furthermore, u,L 
rule violates the Utah unemployment compensation statute 
and as such is ultra vires and is thus invalid. 
POINT III. 
THE DEPARTMENT'S PRACTICE OF TERMINATING 
APPELLANT'S BENEFITS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE 
AND A HEARING DENIED HER DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
In 19 7 0 the United States Supreme Court de cl area 
that a welfare recipient's Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights would be violated if that recipient were terminam 
from welfare benefits without notice and a pre-terminatior 
fair hearing. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Ir. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, the court found that: "Relevant 
constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal o' 
public assistance benefits as to disqualification for 
unemployment compensation." Id. at 262 (emphasis added). 
The New York procedure challenged in Goldberg v. 
Kelly provided that a caseworker who had doubts about ' 
recipient's continued eligibility for benefits would firsr 
discuss these doubts with the recipient. If the caseworke'. 
concluded that the recipient was no longer eligible 
would recommend termination of aid to a unit supervisor. 
the latter concurred, he/she would send the recipient 
letter stating the reasons for proposing to terminate ai 
The letter also informed the recipient that within seve 
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:a/s he or she could request that a higher official review 
the record and that she could submit a written statement in 
suppCJrt of her claim. If the reviewing official affirmed 
+:he determination of ineligibility, aid would be terminated 
immediately. After termination, the recipient was entitled 
to a "fair hearing" and after that to judicial review. The 
challenge to this procedure was that it did not allow for 
the personal appearance of the recipient before a reviewing 
0fficial, for oral presentation of evidence, and for 
confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses 
prior to termination. 
Respondent's procedures for termination of 
unemployment compensation in Utah are much more inadquate 
than those procedures that Goldberg v. Kelly invalidated. 
Like the New York procedure, Utah provides for an initial 
confrontation 
representative. 
between a claimant and an agency 
However, in Utah no notice of the reasons 
for termination is ever given prior to termination. 
Furthermore, the Utah claimant is never allowed to even make 
a written objection prior to termination as the recipient in 
Goldberg v. Kelly was. Thus, there is even less due process 
allowed in Utah and more reason to strike down the procedure 
than there was in Goldberg v. Kelly. 
A year after the Goldberg v. Kelly decision, the 
'' Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to California's 
procedure for unemployment compensation 
benefits. California Department of Human Resources 
19 
Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). Califcrn1 
Unemployment Compensation recipients had in 1 t ia ily 
the action to enjoin California frorr, termindting U:e 
benefits without a pre-termination hearing. Java 
---.'._ 
California Department of Human Re sources, 31 7 F. Supp. , 
(N.D. Cal. 1970). They argued that there was a median dela·. 
of seven weeks before payments were resumed and that 
violated the cliamant' s federal statutory and Constitutione 
rights. The Federal Court for the Northern District c.' 
California held that this delay violated 42 U.S.C. §503(a 1 
which requires that payments be made "when due." or 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, the District Court also held tha'. 
denial of a pre-termination hearing violated the claimants' 
right to due process of law. In reading its conclusions, 
the court balanced the claimants' interest in having b 
necessities of life while the bureaucracy mul::.s over his c: 
her continued eligibility against the state's interest 
protecting public funds. 
On review by the Supreme Court it was found that 
termination of unemployment compensation benefits without' 
pre-termination hearing violated 42 U.S.C. §503 becaus2 
benefits would not be paid "when due." The court reasor.e. 
that Congress had intended for unemployment benefits 
provide cash at a time when a claimant has nothing else ' 
spend, thus maintaining the claimant at subsistence le•'t 
without the necessity of turning to welfare or pfl'ld' 
charity. In addition, Congress intended · 
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1 nsurance payments to act as a means of exerting an 
1 ri t I uen·:·e upon the stability of industry. 
The United States District Court for Vermont 
re·d<-ned the same conclusions in Wheeler v. State of Vermont, 
l3S F.Supp. 856 (D.Vermont 1972). In Wheeler the claimant 
was called in for a "periodic interview" during which she 
•.-Jas given a form on which to list the names of firms 
contacted. The form also contained this language: 
You are to contact three places of 
employment as a routine factory worker 
or general office clerk between 
2/17 /71 and 2/24/71. These are to be 
personal contacts in the Rutland area. 
Id. at 858. A week later the claimant was called in for 
another interview where she signed a statement filled out 
and read to her by the interviewer. The statement read in 
pertinent part: 
I did not actively seek work as 
directed by making personal contacts 
during the week of 2/17/71 and 2/24/71 
because I answered 2 ads in the 
Rutland Herald. I talked to an 
individual in personnel in one ad and 
was informed I had the qualifications 
for the job and I would be notified if 
I got the job. I felt fairly sure 
after the phone conversation that I 
had the job and therefore, made no 
other contacts. 
Id at 858-859. 
The day after signing this statement the claimant 
,,,,s terminated from benefits. The next week the claimant 
signed a second statement which read: 
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I did not actively seek work as 
directed by the local offices because 
I did not have transportation during 
the week ending 
Id. at 859. That same day a second determination advercc , 
the claimant was made. 
After an adverse "fair hearing" determination, t;,; 
claimant brought suit alleging that due process had beer. 
denied her because ( 1) the fact-finding interviews were not 
conducted by the same person making the decision 
terminate her benefits, (2) there was no prior notice tt 2t 
the fact-finding process was to take place, ( 3 J there was nc 
opportunity to know beforehand the specific reasons for 
terminations of her benefits, and(4) the claimant did no' 
have an opportunity to consult with counsel or to confront 
or cross-examine witnesses before the decision to terminate 
her benefits was made. 
The court held that because the average 
between termination of a Vermont claimant's benefits and 
fair hearing was 3 7. 5 days, the Vermont procedure viola tee 
42 U.S.C. §503(a) (1) in that benefits were not paid "wher 
due." The court also held unemployment compensaticr 
benefits could not be treated differently from the welfar· 
benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); tnE 
wages in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 
(1969); the right to a tax exemption in Speiser v. Randal_ 
357 U.S. 513 (1958); or the right to public employment 1 
Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (195° 1 
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The Utah procedure applied against Appellant 
Pa·.1Utelis 
,/prmont 
was even 
procedure 
more 
in 
violative 
Wheeler. 
of her rights 
Appellant 
than the 
was only 
jnterviewed on one occasion prior to the termination of her 
benefits. She was given no warning whatsoever prior to that 
interview as to what to expect. She was not told she could 
have an attorney present at the interview. Nor was she 
advised beforehand what issues would be raised at the 
interview or that the interview might result in the 
termination of her benefits. Like the Wheeler claimant, 
Appellant was directed to sign a statement written by the 
agency representative. She was told that if she didn't sign 
the statement her benefits could be terminated. Like the 
claimant in Wheeler, Appellant's benefits were terminated a 
few days after the interview, based on information received 
during the interview. However, Appellant's benefits were 
terminated retroactively a full month prior to the interview 
thus creating a large overpayment. Furthermore, Appellant 
waited two months between the time she applied for a fa·ir 
hearing and the time she received the hearing decision. The 
average claimant in Vermont had but a 37. 5 day wait. In 
fact, Appellant's waiting period was as long as the one 
1vhich the u "s. supreme Court struck down in California 
of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 
121 11971), discussed above. There is thus even more reason 
to hold Utah's procedure invalid than there was to hold 
1Jermo11t 's invalid. 
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Agnes Payotelis' claim was terY'linated eiqht , 
after she had been called in for an eligibility 
that time, she had presented her Eligibilit"• Re·,i·:•.: r 
plus a supplemental list which was lost the Deoartrl'f 
During her Eligibility Review, Appellant was direrted 
sign a statement written by Department Representative 
Chapman, confessing to make only telephone calls. On he 
appeal request, Appellant made it clear that she nevo• ---· 
admitted to only contacting firms by telephone. Again, a: 
her hearing, Appellant testified that she disagreed tha: 
telephone calls were her only job search activity. Tr. 1: 
scenario illustrates the precise reasons why the 
District Court for the district of Connecticut struck do••: 
an identical practice in that state. See Steinberg 
Fusari, 364 F.Supp. 922 (D.Conn. 1973). 
In Connecticut, a recipient was required to maKt 
bi-weekly visits to the Unemployment Compensation Departmer.: 
to fill out a "Continued Claim for Unemp loymen: 
Compensation" upon which he would swear to his 
for work and his "reasonable efforts" to find work. He a'. 0 : 
would fill out a "Continued Claim Work Effort Inforrnati. 
Form." These papers were then presented to an employee :· 
the Department; if no questions were raised, he was 
If the Department employee raised an issue of poss1t· 
disqualification, the claimant was sent in for a "ce.,t· 
interview." He was then interviewed by a "Fact Fine: 
Examiner," who sought to ascertain facts as to poss 10 -' 
.J:suua:ification. If the examiner decided that the claimant 
rnu not conducted a diligent job search, the claimant was 
cwt r:iivcn his check and was told that he would receive 
notification. A letter was then sent out under the 
s1qnature of the office manager stating the reasons for 
termination. 
The Steinberg court held that the "seated inter-
view" system did not provide sufficient procedural due 
process. Claimants were provided no advance notice of the 
interview, or of the precise issues involved, and conse-
quently had no opportunity to either prepare their arguments 
or present witnesses on their behalf. Nor were claimants 
provided with an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses. 
No opportunity was provided to consult with counsel either. 
Finding due process lacking, the Connecticut court enjoined 
the Department from continuing this practice. 
This case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) who remanded the 
case in light of the fact that the Connecticut Legislature 
had enacted major revisions, some of which were designed to 
alleviate problems that the lower court had identified. 
The comparison between Utah's practices and 
Connecticut's is quite obvious. Payotelis was terminated 
'' 1t Jiuut prior notice or a Goldberg v. Kelly hearing. She 
"''1s never provided an adequate opportunity to present her 
3rguments nor present the additional information that she 
had. She was merely summarily terminated from benefits. 
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This termination has caused Appellant treme;,-.; 
hardship. She has had to sell her personal property iust 
pay her $125.00 monthly house payments. Among the :· 
that she has had to sell were her t.v., stereo, microw 2 .. 
extra tires, and some other household items. She is behi: 
on her utility payments and is afraid of her gas being sb 
off. She testified that at one point, for at least :·,, 
days, she has had to go hungry. It was exactly the 55 
results that the federal and state unemployment compensat 1or 
laws were enacted to prevent. See, e.g. Java v. Califor;," 
Department of Human Resources Development, 317 F.Supp. 8' 
(N.D. Cal. 1970). 
Respondent's procedure thus violated Payotelis' 
due process rights to notice and a fair hearing as well " 
42 u.s.c. §503 (a) (1) which requires that unemployme:• 
compensation benefits be provided "when due." Responder: 
should be enjoined from further application of the" 
procedures and required to provide a fair hearing prior t: 
termination of a claimants benefits. 
POINT IV. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The role of the Utah Supreme Court under Sect: 
35-4-lO(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act is to: 
[S]ustain the determination of the 
Board of Review, unless the record 
clearly and persuasively proves the 
action of the Board was arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable. 
Specifically, as a matter of law, the 
26 
determination was wrong; because only 
the opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from the facts. 
u.-nt inental Oil Company v. Board of Review of Industrial 
commission, 568 P. 2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1977). 
As stated above, Respondent has deprived Appellant 
of her sole means of support through a rigid and inflexible 
iob search requirement. Appellant made 35 employer contacts 
over a 67 day period, an amount far exceeding the reasonable 
Job search efforts being upheld in most cases. Yet she has 
been denied benefits by Respondent because she did not make 
2 to 3 new in-person employer contacts each week. As shown 
above, Respondent's requirement is void because it violates 
Utah Employment Security statutes and because it had not 
been promulgated under Utah's Administrative Rule-making Act 
at the time it was applied against Appellant. Thus, 
Respondent's deprivation of Appellant's benefits for failure 
to meet an invalid requirement was arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. 
Respondent also violated Appellant's due process 
rights to notice and a pre-termination hearing. In 
addition, Respondent violated 42 U.S.C. §503 (a) (1) by 
failing to insure that benefits were provided when due. 
These acts were also arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
Finally, Respondent has caused hardships to 
'l pe l lant which far exceed any wrong which Respondent could 
Pver conceivably find in Appellant's actions. All of these 
hardships have resulted because of Respondent's arbitrary, 
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capricious and unreasonable application of an inf lexio> , 
invalid standard. This Court should stril<e down and eni,, 
Respondent's illegal practices, reverse Responrier.• 
findings, and award full benefits to the Appellant, ?.er.' 
Payotelis. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Payotelis has presented copious evidenc, 
as proof of her diligent job search efforts that demonstn'.• 
her continuing attachment to the labor market. Appellant'; 
actions fully comply with the requirements of Utah la". 
Utah law did not require the 2 to 3 new in-person contac:; 
per week when Payotelis' claim was terminated. 
unwritten rule was void as it had not been legal. 
promulgated. Furthermore, it remains void even afte1 
promulgation because it is in conflict with Utah statutor 
law as interpreted by case law. 
Finally, Appellant was terminated from benefits:· 
violation of law as she was not provided prior notice ar.c' 
due process hearing, and because this practice of 
Respondent was not reasonably calculated to insure f" 
payment of unemployment compensation benefits when due. 
Appellant therefore requests that she 
reimbursed for all benefits denied her and that tc· 
Department be enjoined from terminating her claim again 
any reason other than exhaustion of benefits without i1:· 
providing her with due process of law. 
II 
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DATED this day of May, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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E:.lPLOr.IENT SECURITY 
174 Social iiall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADOPTED ttotts 
AHM File No. 6106, Adopted Amendment 
Title (Jenera! Rules of Adjudication. 
Brief extract of rule: Able and Available, 
Section 160 - Effort of Secure Employ· 
rnent, Actively Seeking Work. 
Redefines "good faith effort" to find 
work as including, but not limited to, in-
person contacts with employers. 
Also. creates a rebuttable presumption 
of failure to make an active work search 
when a claimant fails to make a specific 
minimum number of in-person employer 
contacts after being instructed by his local 
office to do so. 
Effective date: April 5, 1982. 
ARM File No, 6107, Adopted Amendment 
Title: General Rules of Adjudication. 
Brief extract of rule: Able and Available, 
Section 190 · Evidence, Burden of Proof. 
Requires a claimant to keep a record 
of his work search efforts; permits retro· 
active disqualification and assessment of a 
fault overpayment for failure to establish 
to the satisfaction of the Department that 
the claimant made an active work search; 
retroactive disqualification is limited to 
four ( 4) weeks. 
Effective date: April 5, 1983. 
ARM File No. 6108, Adopted Amendment 
Title: General Rules of Adjudication. 
Brief extract of rule: Volunatary Leaving, 
Section 155.2 . Movement to Another Lo· 
cality. 
Removes provision allowing good 
cause for quit to accompany a spouse, to 
bring Rule into conformity with 1982 a-
mentment of Section 35-4-5(a), which 
states that a quit to accompany, follow or 
join a spouse is without good cause. 
Effective date: April 5, 1983. 
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